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2o The Instriimentalism of John Dewey 
The approach of John Dewey to philosophy, while influenced 
by many of the same factors which were important to Russell, and 
despite his agreement with Russell on many social issues, takes 
a radically different direction» Dewey sees a person's philosophy 
as more intimately and internally related to the social processes 
than does Russell. Instead of viewing it as primarily a means of 
analysis and clarification, Dewey sees the role of philosophy as 
a method of social reconstruction, and logic as a method of inqu­
iry rather than a means of exploring the implications of analyt­
ical definitions and empirical facts» It is therefore not surprising 
that his categories for dealing with different philosophies are 
conservative and progressive, rather than critical and constructive 
or idealistic and materialistic. How he arrived at his instrumen­
talist philosophy can best be understood by tracing briefly his 
own long intellectual jpilgrimage, 
John Dewey (1859-1952) was born of middle-class Puritan 
stock in Vermont, and educated at that state's university. Gradu­
ating at an early age he went to The Johns Hopkins University, 
then recently established to provide advanced study for American 
students„ Here he came under the influence of Hegelian thought, 
which provided him witii what appeared to be an intellectually 
respectable synthesis of his current religious and philosophical 
interests, much as it had for Russell and others. While Dewey was 
later to reject much of Hegelianism, he never lost the demand for 
• Reprinted from Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic and 
Other Essays (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,1910), pp. 
46-57, Used with permission. 
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comprehensiveness and the insistence on the importance of social 
and cultural forces which were two of its major contributions. 
His doctoral dissertation dealt with the psychology of Kant, 
the results of which were to be of great importance for his 
thought» 
While he was teaching at the University of Michigan (1884-
1888, 1889-1894), two major interests undermined his Hegelian­
ism. First, the more practical emphases of Kant led him to 
reject rational idealism's interpretation of Mind as a consti­
tutive and determinative factor in the universe. Second, the 
psychology of William James tended to confirm this conclusion. 
But Dewey did not enter the camp of the materialists. Rather, 
he began to see mind as a biologically grounded instrument of 
the interaction between the person and his environment. Mind 
evolves just aSj, according to Darwin, any other part of the 
human organism evolves. Its special role is that of participant 
rather than either spectator or dictator in man's social evolu­
tion, Such an interpretation of mind had the further advantage 
of being open to objective, public, and scientific study. The 
combination of these ethical and psychological interests explains 
Dewey's lifelong emphasis on the close relationship between 
philosophy on the one hand and biology and psychology on the 
other. 
In 1894 Dewey began teaching philosophy at the University 
of Chicago, where he was also responsible for psychology and peda­
gogy, Here were brought to full bloom his interests in education 
through contacts with teachers and the Laboratory School, a 
private experimental venture. Here what came to be called progress­
ive education was launched. Also Dewey met Jane Addams (1860-1935), 
the founder and operator of Hull House, the famous settlement 
house. As a result of this relationship he became more involved 
in the social problems of large industrial cities. The arbitrary 
absorption of the Laboratory School by the university brought the 
resignation of Dewey and others (1904), and it was only through 
the help of friends that he was able to obtain another academic 
appointment, 
From 1904 until his retirement in 1930 Dewey was the out­
standing teacher of Columbia University's philosophy department. 
Here, under the influence of his new colleagues and environment, 
his philosophical and political thought matured and received its 
most complete expression. He shed his earlier liberal optimism 
for a more radical liberalism which called for the application of 
political democracy to the realms of economic theory and practice. 
During these years he wrote such books as Reconstruction in Philo­
sophy (lectures at the Imperial University in Tokyo, published in 
1920), The Quest for Certainty (the Gifford Lecture, published in 
1929), and Art as Experience (1934), While his literary style 
never rivaled Russell's, each book resembling a detailed discussion 
of all of the factors involved in the problem at hand, innumerable 
writings flowed from his pen and were translated into every major 
modern language. From his position at Columbia he influenced an 
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ever-widening circle of people, directly and indirectly, by his 
teaching, writing, speaking, and personal contacts. 
Dewey's philosophy, like Russell's, is thoroughly natural­
istic, rejecting transcendent absolutes of all sorts, and also 
antimetaphysical. Unlike Russell, however, he makes a sustained 
attempt at synthesis. But this attempt is made in terms of 
method rather than in terms of metaphysics. And his instrumental 
method, as Dewey called it, has two unique features. , It is, on 
the one hand, an attempt to apply Dewey's interpretation of the 
scientific method to the human and social areas. By viewing 
scientific ideas practically, instead of theoretically, Dewey 
would unite the scientific and ethical strivings of men, while 
at the same time avoiding any absolutes. Since scientific and 
all other ideas are but means for change, he suggests that it 
is possible to treat them as instrumental ideas, rather than as 
universals or finalities. On the other hand, since all such 
ideas receive their validation from within the realm of evolving 
human experience, he claims that such a method is itself incapable 
of becoming absolute, but is rather a continually self-correcting 
tool. It is only by viewing philosophy this way, as an ever-
reconstructed method, that men will be able to solve their social 
and cultural problems, and at the same time preserve their demo­
cratic tradition. 
The selection which follows, "The Influence of Darwinism on 
Philosophy," was written during Dewey's Columbia period (1909). 
It is one of the most clearly written of his works, and represents 
many of his important points as well as his attitude toward 
philosophy as a whole. 
I 
That the publication of the "Origin of Species" marked 
an epoch in the development of the natural sciences is well 
known to the layman. That the combination of the very words, 
origin and species embodied an intellectual revolt and 
introduced a new intellectual temper is easily overlooked 
by the expert. The conceptions that had reigned in the philo­
sophy of nature and knowledge for two thousand years, the 
conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the 
mind, rested on the assumption of the superiority of the 
fixed and final; they rested upon treating change and origin 
as signs of defect and unreality. In laying hands upon the 
sacred ark of absolute permanency, in treating the forms 
that had been regarded as types of fixity and perfection as 
originating and passing away, the 'Origin of Species" intro­
duced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to trans­
form the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of 
morals, politics, and religion. 
No wonder, then, that the publication of Darwin's book, 
a half century aeco, precipitated a crisis. The true nature 
of the controversv is easily concealed from us, however, by 
the theological clamor that attended it. The vivid and 
popular features of the anti-Darwinian row tended to leave 
the impression that the issue was between science on one side 
XXII p. 17 
and theology on the other. Such was not the case — the issue 
lay primarily within science itself, as Darwin himself early 
recognized. The theological outcry he discounted from the 
start, hardly noticing it save as it bore upon the "feelings 
of his female relatives." But for two decades before final 
publication he contemplated the possibility of being put 
down by his scientific peers as a fool or as crazy; and he 
set, as the measure of his success, the degree in which he 
should affect three men of science: Lyell in geology. Hooker 
in botany, and Huxley in zoology. 
Religious considerations lent fervor to the controversy, 
but they did not provoke it. Intellectually, religious emotions 
are not creative but conservative. They attach themselves 
readily to the current view of the world and consecrate it. 
They steep and dye intellectual fabrics in the seething 
vat of emotions; they do not form their warp and woof. 
There is not, I think, an instance of any large idea about 
the world being independently generated by religion. Although 
the ideas that rose up like armed men against Darwinism 
owed their intensity to religious associations, their origin 
and meaning are to be sought in science and philosophy, 
not in religion. 
II 
Few words in our language foreshorten intellectual his­
tory as much as does the word species. The Greeks, in initiating 
the intellectual life of Europe, were impressed by character­
istic traits of the life of plants and animals; so impressed 
indeed that they made these traits the key to defining nature 
and to explaining mind and society. And truly, life is so 
wonderful that a seemingly successful reading of its mystery 
might well lead men to believe that the key to the secrets of 
heaven and earth was in their hands. The Greek rendering of 
this mystery, the Greek formulation of the aim and standard 
of knowledge, was in the course of time embodied in the word 
species, and it controlled philosophy for two thousand years. 
To understand the intellectual face-about expressed in the 
phrase "Origin of Species," we must, then, understand the long 
dominant idea against which it is a protest. 
Consider how men were impressed by the facts of life. 
I Their eyes fell upon certain things slight in bulk, and frail 
1 in structure. To every appearance, these perceived things were 
inert and passive. Suddenly, under certain circumstances, 
these things — henceforth known as seeds or eggs or germs --
begin to change, to change rapidly in size, form, and qualities. 
Rapid and extensive changes occur, however, in many things — 
as when wood is touched by fire. But the changes in the 
living thing are orderly; they are cumulative; they tend con­
stantly in one direction; they do not, like other changes, 
destroy or consume, or pass fruitless into wandering flux; 
they realize and fulfil. Each successive stage, no matter 
how unlike its predecessor, preserves its net effect and also 
prepares the way for a fuller activity on the part of its suc-
i Qessor. In living beings, changes do not happen as they seem 
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to happen elsewhere, any which way; the earlier changes are 
regulated in view of later results. This progressive organization 
does not cease till there is achieved a true final term..,a 
completed, perfected end. This final form exercises in turn a 
plenitude of functions, not the least noteworthy of which is 
production of germs like those from which it took its own 
origin, germs capable of the same cycle of self-fulfilling 
activity„ 
But the whole miraculous tale is not yet told. The same 
drama is enacted to the same destiny in countless myriads of 
individuals so sundered in time, so severed in space, that 
they have no opportunity for mutual consultation and no means 
of interaction. As an old writer quaintly said, "things of 
the same kind go through the same formalities" — celebrate, 
as it were, the same ceremonial rites. 
This formal activity which operates throughout a series 
of changes and holds them to a single course; which subord­
inates their aimless flux to its own perfect manifestation; 
which, leaping the boundaries of s^pace and time, keeps indiv­
iduals distant in space and remote in time to a uniform type 
of structure and function; this principle seemed to give 
insight into the very nature of reality itself. To it 
Aristotle gave the name [which] the scholastics translated 
as species. 
The force of this term is deepened by its application 
to everything in the universe that observes order in flux and 
manifests constancy through change. From the casual drift 
of daily weather, through the uneven recurrence of seasons 
and unequal return of seed time and harvest, up to the maj­
estic sweep of the heavens — the image of eternity in time 
— and from this to the unchanging pure and contemplative 
intelligence beyond nature lies one unbroken fulfilment of 
ends. Nature as a whole is a progressive realization of 
purpose strictly comparable to the realization of purpose in 
any single plant or animal. 
The concepcxon ofspecies, a fixed form and final 
cause, was the central principle of knowledge as well as of 
nature. Upon it rested the logic of science. Change as change 
is mere flux and lapse; it insults intelligence. Genuinely 
to know is to grasp a permanent end that realizes itself 
through changes, holding them thereby within the metes and 
bounds of fixed truth. Completely to know is to relate all 
special forms to their one single end and good: pure contem­
plative intelligence. Since, however, the scene of nature 
which directly confronts us is in change, nature as directly 
and practically experienced does not satisfy the conditions 
of knowledge. Human experience is in flux, and hence the 
instrumentalities of sense-perception and of inference based 
upon observation are condemned in advance. Science is com­
pelled to aim at realities lying behind and beyond the pro-. 
cesses of nature, and to carry on its search for these 
realities by means of rational forms transcending ordinary 
modes of perception and inference,, 
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There are, indeed, but two alternative courses. We must 
either find the appropriate objects and organs of knowledge 
in the mutual interactions of changing things; or else, to 
escape the infection of change, we must seek them in some 
transcendent and supernal region. The human mind, deliber­
ately as it were, exhausted the logic of the changeless, the 
final, and the transcendent, before it essayed adventure on 
the pathless wastes of generation and transformation. We 
dispose all too easily of the efforts of the schoolmen to 
interpret nature and mind in terms of real essences, hidden 
forms, and occult faculties, forgetful of the seriousness 
and dignity of the ideas that lay behind. We dispose of 
them by laughing at the famous gentleman who accounted for 
the fact that opium put people to sleep on the ground it had 
a dormitive faculty. But the doctrine, held in our own day, 
that knowledge of the plant that yields the poppy consists 
in referring the peculiarities of an individual to a type, 
to a universal form, a doctrine so firmly established that 
any other method of knowing was conceived to be unphilo-
sophical and unscientific, is a survival of precisely the 
same logic. This identity of conception in the scholastic 
and anti-Darwinian theory may well suggest greater sympathy 
for what has become unfamiliar as well as greater humility 
regarding the further unfamiliarities that history has in 
store, 
Darwin was not, of course, the first to question the 
classic philosophy of nature and of knowledge. The begin­
nings of the revolution are in the physical science of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When Galileo said: 
"It is my opinion that the earth is very noble and admir­
able by reason of so many and so different alterations and 
generations which are incessantly made therein," he expressed 
the changed temper that was coming over the world; the 
transfer of interest from the permanent to the changing. 
When Descartes said: "The nature of physical things is much 
more easily conceived when they are beheld coming gradually 
into existence, thkn when they are only considered as 
produced at once in a finished and perfect state," the 
modern world became self-conscious of the logic that was 
henceforth to control it, the logic of which Darwin's "Origin 
of Species" is the latest scientific achievement. Without 
the methods of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and their suc­
cessors in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, Darwin would 
have been helpless in the organic sciences. But prior to 
Darwin the impact of the new scientific method upon life, 
mind, and politics, had been arrested, because between these 
ideal or moral interests and the inorganic world intervened 
the kingdom of plants and animals. The gates of the garden 
of life were barred to the new ideas; and only through this 
garden was there access to mind and politics. The influence 
of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having conquered the 
phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby 
freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and 
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life. When he said of species what Galileo had said of the 
earth.oohe emancipated, once for all, genetic and experi­
mental ideas as an organon of asking questions and looking 
for explanations. 
Ill 
The exact bearings upon philosophy of the new logical 
outlook are, of course, as yet, uncertain and inchoate. We 
live in the twilight of intellectual transition. One must 
add the rashness of the prophet to the stubbornness of the 
partizan to venture a systematic exposition of the influence 
upon philosophy of the Darwinian method. At best, we can but 
inquire as to its general bearing — the effect upon mental 
temper and complexion, upon that body of half-conscious, 
half-instinctive intellectual aversions and preferences which 
determine, after all, our more deliberate intellectual enter­
prises. In this vague inquiry there happens to exist as a 
kind of touchstone a problem of long historic currency that 
has also been much discussed in Darwinian literature. I 
refer to the old problem of design versus chance, mind versus 
matter, as the causal explanation, first"~or final, of things. 
As we have already seen, the classic notion of species 
carried with it the idea of purpose. In all living forms, a 
specific type is present directing the earlier stages of 
growth to the realization of its own perfection. Since this 
purposive regulative principle is not visible to the senses, 
it follows that it must be an ideal or rational force. Since, 
however, the perfect form is gradually approximated through 
the sensible changes, it also follows that in and through a 
sensible realm a rational ideal force is working out its 
own ultimate manifestation. These inferences were extended to 
nature: (a) She does nothing in vain; but all for an ulterior 
purpose. (b) Within natural sensible events there is therefore 
contained a spiritual causal force, which as spiritual escapes 
perception, but is apprehended by an enlightened reason. (c) 
The manifestation of this principle brings about a subordin­
ation of matter and sense to its own realization, and this 
ultimate fulfilment is the goal of nature and of man. The 
design argument thus operated in two directions. Purposeful-
ness accounted for the intelligibility of nature and the 
possibility of science, while the absolute or cosmic character 
of this purposefulness gave sanction and worth to the moral 
and religious endeavors of man. Science was underpinned and 
morals authorized by one and the same principle, and their 
mutual agreement was eternally guaranteed. 
This philosophy remained, in spite of sceptical and 
polemic outbursts, the official and the regnant philosophy of 
Europe for over two thousand years. The expulsion of fixed 
first and final causes from astronomy, physics, and chemistry 
had indeed given the doctrine something of a shock. But, on 
the other hand, increased acquaintance with the details of 
plant and animal life operated as a counterbalance and perhaps 
even strengthened the argument from design. The marvelous 
adaptation of organisms to their environment, of organs to 
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the organism, of unlike parts of a complex organ — like the 
eye — to the organ itself; the foreshadowing by lower forms 
of the higher; the preparation in earlier stages of growth 
for organs that only later had their functioning — these 
things were increasingly recognized with the progress of 
botany, zoology, palaeontology, and embryology. Together, 
they added such prestige to the design argument that by the 
late eighteenth century it was, as approved by the sciences 
of organic life, the central point of theistic and idealistic 
philosophy. 
The Darwinian principle of natural selection cut 
straight under this philosophy. If all organic adaptations 
are due simply to constant variation and the elimination of 
those variations which are harmful in the struggle for exis­
tence that is brought about by excessive reproduction, there 
is no call for a prior intelligent causal force to plan and 
preordain them. Hostile critics charged Darwin with material­
ism and with making chance the cause of the universe. 
Some naturalists, like Asa Gray, favored the Darwinian 
principle and attempted to reconcile it with design. Gray held 
to what may be called design on the installment plan. If we 
conceive the "stream of variations" to be itself intended, we 
may suppose that each successive variation was designed from 
the first to be selected. In that case, variation, struggle, 
and selection simply define the mechanism of "secondary 
causes" through which the "first cause" acts; and the doctrine 
of design is none the worse off because we know more of its 
modus operandi. 
Darwin could not accept this mediating proposal. He 
admits or rather he asserts that it is "impossible to conceive 
this immense and wonderful universe including man with his 
capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity as the 
result of blind chance or necessity." But nevertheless he holds 
that since variations are in useless as well as useful directions, 
and since the latter are sifted out simply by the stress of the 
conditions of struggle for existence, the design argument as 
applied to living beings is unjustifiable; and its lack of sup­
port there deprives it of scientific value as applied to nature 
in general. If the variations of the pigeon, which under selec­
tion give the pouter pigeon, are not preordained for the sake 
of the breeder, by what logic do we argue that variations 
resulting in natural species are pre-designed? 
IV 
So much for some of the more obvious facts of the dis­
cussion of design versus chance, as causal principles of nature 
and of life as a whole. We brought up this discussion, you re­
call, as a crucial instance. What does our touchstone indicate 
as to the bearing of Darwinian ideas upon philosophy? In the 
first place, the new logic outlaws, flanks, dismisses — what 
you will — one type of problems and substitutes for it another 
type. Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and 
absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the 
specific conditions that generate them. 
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Darwin concluded that the impossibility of assigning the 
world to chance as a whole and to design in its parts indic­
ated the insolubility of the question. Two radically different 
reasons, however, may be given as to why a problem is insoluble. 
One reason is that the problem is too high for intelligence; 
the other is that the question in its very asking makes assum­
ptions that render the question meaningless. The latter alter­
native is unerringly pointed to in the celebrated case of 
design versus chance. Once admit that the sole verifiable or 
fruitful object of knowledge is the particular set of changes 
that generate the object of study together with the consequences 
that then flow from it, and no intelligible question can be 
asked about what, by assumption, lies outside. To assert — as 
is often asserted — that specific values of particular truth, 
social bonds and forms of beauty, if they can be shown to be 
generated by concretely knowable conditions, are meaningless 
and in vain; to assert that they are justified only when they 
and their particular causes and effects have all at once been 
gathered up into some inclusive first cause and some exhaustive 
final goal, is intellectual atavism.' Such argumentation is 
reversion to the logic that explained the extinction of fire 
by water through the formal essence of aqueousness and the 
quenching of thirst by water through the final cause of aque­
ousness. Whether used in the case of the special event or that 
of life as a whole, such logic only abstracts some aspect of 
the existing course of events in order to reduplicate it as a 
petrified eternal principle by which to explain the very changes 
of which it is the formalizatioUo 
When Henry Sidgwick casually remarked in a letter that 
as he grew older his interest in what or who made the world 
was altered into interest in what kind of a world it is any­
way, his voicing of a common experience of our own day illustrates 
also the nature of that intellectual transformation effected 
by the Darwinian logic. Interest shifts from the wholesale 
essence back of special changes to the question of how special 
changes serve and defeat concrete purposes; shifts from an 
intelligence that shaped things once for all to the particular 
intelligence which things are even now shaping; shifts from 
an ultimate goal of good to the direct increments of justice 
and happiness that intelligent administration of existent 
conditions may beget and that present carelessness or stupidity 
will destroy or forego. 
In the second place, the classic type of logic inevitably 
set philosophy upon proving that life must have certain qualit­
ies and values — no matter how experience presents the matter — 
because of some remote cause and eventual goal. The duty of 
wholesale justification inevitably accompanies all thinking 
that makes the meaning of special occurrences depend upon some­
thing that once and for all lies behind them. The habit of 
derogating from present meanings and uses prevents our looking 
the facts of experience in the face; it prevents seriotls acknow­
ledgment of the evils they present and serious concern with the I goods they promise but do not as yet fulfil. It turns thought to 
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the business of finding a wholesale transcendent remedy for 
the one and guarantee for the other. One is reminded of the 
way many moralists and theologians greeted Herbert Spencer's 
recognition of an unknowable energy from which welled up the 
phenomenal physical processes without and the conscious opera­
tions within. Merely because Spencer labeled his unknowable 
energy "God," this faded piece of metaphysical goods was 
greeted as an important and grateful concession to the reality 
of the spiritual realm. Were it not for the deep hold of the 
habit of seeking justification for ideal values in the remote 
and transcendent, surely this reference of them to an unknow­
able absolute would be despised in comparison with the demon­
strations of experience that knowable energies are daily 
generating about us precious values. 
The displacing of this wholesale type of philosophy 
will doubtless not arrive by sheer logical disproof, but rather 
by growing recognition of its futility. Were it a thousand 
times true that opium produces sleep because of its dormitive 
energy, yet the inducing of sleep in the tired, and the 
recovery to waking life of the poisoned, would not be thereby 
one least step forwarded. And were it a thousand times dia-
lectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by 
a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the 
less truth and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope 
and fear in the concrete, would remain just what and where 
they now are. To improve our education, to ameliorate our 
manners, to advance our politics, we must have recourse to 
specific conditions of generation. 
Finally, the new logic introduces responsibility into the 
intellectual life. To idealize and rationalize the universe 
at large is after all a confession of inability to master the 
courses of things that specifically concern us. As long as 
mankind suffered from this impotency, it naturally shifted 
a burden of responsibility that it could not carry over to 
the more competent shoulders of the transcendent cause. But 
if insight into specific conditions of value and into specific 
consequences of ideas is possible, philosophy must in time 
become a method locating and interpreting the more serious 
of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting 
ways for dealing with them; a method of moral and political 
diagnosis and prognosis. 
The claim to formulate a priori the legislative consti­
tution of the universe is by its nature a claim that may lead 
to elaborate dialectic developments. But it is also one that 
removes these very conclusions from subjection to experimental 
test, for, by definition, these results make no differences in 
the detailed course of events. But a philosophy that humbles 
its pretensions to the work of projecting hypotheses for the 
education and conduct of mind, individual and social, is 
thereby subjected to test by the way in which the ideas it 
propounds work out in practice. In having modesty forced upon 
it, philosophy also acquires responsibility. 
Doubtless I seem to have violated the implied promise of 
my earlier remarks and to have turned both prophet and partizan. 
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But in anticipating the direction of the transformations 
in philosophy to be wrought by the Darwinian genetic and 
experimental logic, I do not profess to speak for any save 
those who yield themselves consciously or unconsciously to 
this logic. No one can fairly deny that at present there are 
two effects of the Darwinian mode of thinking. On the one 
hand, there are making many sincere and vital efforts to 
revise our traditional philosophic conceptions in accordance 
with its demands. On the other hand, there is as definitely 
a recrudescence of absolutistic philosophies; an assertion 
of a type of philosophic knowing distinct from that of the 
sciences, one which opens to us another kind of reality from 
that to which the sciences give access; an appeal through 
experience to something that essentially goes beyond exper­
ience. This reaction affects popular creeds and religious 
movements as well as technical philosophies. The very con­
quest of the biological sciences by the new ideas has led 
many to proclaim an explicit and rigid separation of philo­
sophy from science. 
Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract 
logical forms and categories. They are habits, predispositions, 
deeply engrained attitudes of aversion and preference. More­
over, the conviction persists — though history shows it to be 
a hallucination — that all the questions that the human mind 
has asked are questions that can be answered in terms of the 
alternatives that the questions themselves present. But in 
fact intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer aban­
donment of questions together with both of the alternatives 
they assume — an abandonment that results from their decreasing 
vitality and a change of urgent interest. We do not solve 
them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by dis­
appearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to 
the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place. 
Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of 
old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new 
intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific 
revolution that found its climax in the "Origin of Species."* 
3. Whitehead's Philosophical Synthesis 
In Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) we meet a philosopher 
who was born an Englishman and died an American, and whose thought" 
combined the major recent philosophical contributions of both 
countries in a radically new and startling metaphysical synthesis. 
Unlike both Dewey and Russell, he sees in philosophy neither the 
* John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other 
Essays in Contemporary ThougTfE (New YorE: Henry Holt and Company, 
1910), pp. 1-19 Used with permission. 
